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IGNORING LEGISLATIVE INTENT, DOUBLE
STANDARD OR PROTECTING INTERNATIONAL
TENSION?- RICO AFTER RJR NABISCO
The Italian mafia, known as La Cosa Nostra, was a force to be
reckoned with during the 1960s. 1 In an attempt to control the mob's
increasing activities, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968,
specifically, § 1962, popularly known as the Racketeering Influenced and
Corrupt Organization Act (hereinafter "RICO"), allowing government
officials to finally take down the Italian Mafia.2 RICO "allows federal
prosecutors to stitch together" crimes going back years into one single

Reach of US Law, the US Supreme
1 See Owen Pellet al., FurtherLimiting the Extraterritorial
Court Limits the Use of the RICO Statute, WHITE & CASE (July 8, 2016), available at
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/further-limiting-extraterritorial-reach-us-law-ussupreme-court-limits-use-rico(describing impact of Italian mob on RICO).
2 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012). The statute reads:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful
debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section
2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such
income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the
establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market
for purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in
the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this
subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his
immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activity or
the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to
one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in
law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any
interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct
or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of
subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
Id.; see also Nathan Koppel, They Call It RICO, and It Is Sweeping, THE WALL STREET
2011),
20,
Jan.
updated
(last
JOURNAL
27
3 4 57 6 9 4 11
08 2 9 88 04 (describing
0
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SBl0001424052748704881 0
original intent behind creation of RICO).
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case." 3 RICO's reach within the court system has expanded since its
inception in 1970 and now has various uses in both criminal and civil
proceedings.4 Private plaintiffs can use RICO in civil proceedings because
§ 1964(c) of the Organized Crime Control Act affords a private right of
action to private plaintiffs to sue for RICO violations.' RICO also gives
plaintiffs the right to sue not only for domestic violations, but foreign
conduct as well.6 However, for civil plaintiffs, the foreign application for
RICO violations has been limited by RJR Nabisco v. European Community,
in which plaintiffs must prove a domestic injury to satisfy standing in order
to bring a lawsuit, unlike its criminal counterpart.' A careful analysis will
show the addition of this domestic injury requirement goes directly against
the legislative intent, fails to ease international tension, and fails to follow
precedent by not ruling in accordance with §4 of the Clayton Act. 9
Part I will provide history on the development of RICO, including
the congressional intent behind why Congress developed the RICO Act and
how the Act has been used since its inception.' 0 Part II will provide
background on standing, what a plaintiff needs to establish when bringing a

3 See Koppel, supra note 2 (discussing how crimes are bundled together into single case). The
make-up of RICO makes it easier for prosecutors to convict defendants by presenting a "broader
context in which the crime was committed, along with the pattern of conduct that led up to the
crime." Id.; see also Racketeering-RICO In Need Of fR/eform [sic], JRANK ARTICLES,
http://law.jrank.org/pages/9629/Racketeering-RICO-IN-NEED-FEFORM.html
(last
visited
October 13, 2016) ("When Congress passed the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) Act. . . its intent was to mount an all-fronts attack on the infiltration of
legitimate business by organized criminal enterprises.").
4 See Koppel, supra note 2 (highlighting use of RICO besides criminally, such as in business
fraud for civil suits).
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012):
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962
of this chapter may sue therefore in any appropriate United States district court and shall
recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee, except that no person may rely upon any conduct that would have been
actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities to establish a violation of section
1962. The exception contained in the preceding sentence does not apply to an action
against any person that is criminally convicted in connection with the fraud, in which
case the statute of limitations shall start to run on the date on which the conviction
becomes final.
Id.; see also Racketeering-Rico In Need of /R/eform [sic], supra note 4 (explaining how private
citizens can utilize RICO).
6 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012) (determining scope of civil cases reaching foreign injuries).
7 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016).
See id. at 2111 (describing court's ruling for civil plaintiffs).
9 See infra part VI (expanding on what failed with court's ruling).
"o See infra Part I.
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RICO violation and how it differs in criminal and civil cases." Part III
provides an overview of how courts have ruled in prior decisions involving
RICO on legal issues other than extraterritorial use, including statute of
limitations, accrual rules, and predicate act issues.1 2 Part IV then provides an
overview of Court rulings on acts similar to RICO involving their
extraterritoriality, more specifically in Morrison v. National Austria Bank
Ltd.13 , Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.14 , and Pfizer, Inc. v.
Government of India5 .16 Part V will discuss the facts and analysis behind
the most recent case, RJR Nabisco v. European Community.17 Lastly, Part
VI will explore reasons why the domestic injury standard used for civil cases
should have never been created, and why the Court should view government
plaintiffs and private citizens in the same light with equal standing
requirements.'1
I. DEVELOPMENT OF RICO
A. CongressionalIntent
The RICO Act was passed as Title IX of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970 with the intention to principally be used as a tool for
handling specifically the problem of organized criminal groups infiltrating
legitimate businesses.19 The process began in 1967 with a report from the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
" See infra Part II.
12 See infra Part III.
13 561 U.S. 247 (2010). The Supreme Court in Morrison examined standing under § 10(b)-5
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. at 247. The antifraud provision of the Exchange Act,
§ 10(b)-5, prohibits any "'device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,' and create[s] liability for any
misstatement or omission of a material fact, or one that investors would think was important to
their decision to buy or sell stock." Eugene Temchenko, Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
INSTITUTE,
CORNELL UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL INFORMATION
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/securities-exchange-act-of 1934 (last updated June 2016).
14 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). The Alien Tort Statute analyzed in Kiobel states, "[t]he district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." Id. at 1663.
15 434 U.S. 308 (1978). The Pfizer court analyzed the extraterritoriality of the Clayton Act.
Id. at 310-11; see also infra note 143 and accompanying text (showing actual text of Clayton Act).
16 See infra Part IV.
1 See infra Part V.
1 See infra Part VI.
1
See Gerard Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & II, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 661, 662 (1987) (explaining legislative intent when creating RICO). Since that time, the Act
has barely been used for the purposes of fighting the mob's infiltration of businesses, with only a
few notable prosecutions using RICO for directly infiltrating legitimate businesses by organized
criminals. Id.
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Justice. 20 The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 was largely based on
the findings of this report. 2 1 Even though the report made no suggestions on
creating new law, this was the path Congress decided to follow. 2 2
When first creating RICO, Congress' main focus was organized
crime's infiltration into legitimate fields of businesses and that focus remains
true today. 23 This was made clear in Senator McClellan's speech when he
proposed the new bill.24 Ultimately, creating RICO was seen as a "direct

20 See id. at 666 (describing Commission report to be one of "the most comprehensive
evaluations of crime and crime control."). This Commission was called the "Katzenbach
Commission" and was highly successful in producing substantial legislation, mostly in controlling
crime. Id.; see also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF
JUSTICE, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, U.S. GOV'T PRINTING OFFICE (Feb.
1976), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/42.pdf (noting Commission's official report). This
Commission was created by President Lyndon Johnson in 1965. Exec. Order No. 11,236, 3 C.F.R.
§ 329 (1965).
21 See Lynch, supra note 19, at 667 (discussing report's findings). There were three aspects
of the report that were most relevant to the creation of the RICO Act. Id. Those three aspects were
"its understanding of what organized crime is, its emphasis on the danger of organized crime's
infiltration of legitimate institutions, and its recommendations for dealing with the problem." Id.
The report defined organized crime as "a society that seeks to operate outside the control of the
American people and their governments. It involves thousands of criminals, working within
structures as complex as those of any large corporation, subject to laws more rigidly enforced than
those of legitimate governments." Id.at 667. When elaborating on the second relevant aspect in the
report, the Commission described that the organized criminals infiltrate legitimate businesses and
labor unions. Id. at 669. More specifically, the Commission emphasizes that organized crime
"employs illegitimate methods-monopolization, terrorism, extortion, tax evasion- to drive out of
control lawful ownership and leadership and to exact illegal profits from the public." Id. Lastly,
their recommendations generally concerned creating "new investigative tools for law enforcement,
rather than [changing] the substantive criminal law." Id. at 670.
22 See id. at 671 (highlighting Commission's recommendation of no innovations to penal
code). The Commission did state that the infiltration problem was one that could be dealt with
through enforcement of already existing civil procedures and regulations against the illegal
activities of organized criminals in operating legitimate businesses. Id. at 672; see also
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note
20, at 208 (listing other ways to deal with infiltration problem). The Commission noted state
income tax enforcement, food inspectors, liquor authorities, and certain civil proceedings as other
avenues to try and control the problem aside from creating the RICO Act. Id.
23 See Lynch, supra note 19, at 674 (examining Senate's primary focus). The Senate had other
worries surrounding organized crime, such as its infiltration into labor organizations and its
corruption within government agencies. Id. at 675.
24 See Lynch, supra note 19, at 677 (noting speech). McClellan's speech stated:
[O]rganized crime is increasingly taking over organizations in our country, presenting
an intolerable increase in deterioration of our Nation's standards ... .To aid in the
pressing need to remove organized crime from legitimate organizations in our country,
I have thus formulated this bill ... designed to attack the infiltration of legitimate
business repeatedly outlined by investigations of various congressional committees and
the President's Crime Commission.
Id.
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attack" on the penetration of legitimate organizations by organized crime. 25
It was said that this Act was to only target illegitimate business, but that
intention was not reflected by Congress's broad drafting of the Act. 26
Congress's theme of broad drafting remained true as each critical term of
each subsection was meticulously drafted.27 The reason for expanding
RICO's use and keeping the text broad was driven by the fundamental,
definitional, and criminological difficulties within the project Congress
embarked upon.28
Congress then turned to an already existing statute they knew would
encompass their intentions in keeping the RICO Act's uses broad, § 4 of the
Clayton Act. 2 9 The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated the RICO Act was
drafted to resemble the same values and limitations as the Clayton Act.30 For
instance, both statutes are "designed to remedy economic injury by providing
treble-damages, costs, and attorney's fees."" RICO and § 4 of the Clayton
Act also penalize the same type of injury stating "any person injured in his
business or property by reason of a violation of § 1962 ... may sue .... "32
"Congress consciously patterned the civil RICO portion of the statute after
the Clayton Act." 33
25 See id. at 678 (explaining need to protect public).

26 See id. at 679 (explaining why Congress drafted RICO broadly). Senators Blakey and
Gettings described the legislative history of RICO explaining that its objective in infiltrating
legitimate businesses was not its only purpose. Id. at 680.
27 See Lynch, supra note 19, at 682-83 (discussing how RICO was drafted broadly). The
drafters of RICO made sure specific words were defined and used broadly in order to encompass
more than just one specific meaning. Id. at 682. For example, the bill broadly defined "enterprise"
to include "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union
or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." Id. Additionally, the drafters
defined organized crime by listing a variety of crimes to which the prohibitions of the act applied
(i.e. what it did), rather than what organized crime was. Id. at 683. Lastly, the bill made sure the
individuals to which the Act applied was defined broadly by applying the Act to anyone who
"participate[s], directly or indirectly, in the conduct of [an] enterprise's affairs," and not just the
infiltrating gangsters. Id.
28 See id. at 685-95 (discussing definitional difficulties Congress faced). Some of the words
and terms Congress had trouble defining were organized crime, legitimate business, infiltration,
and pattern of racketeering. Id. at 685.
29 See infra note 146 and accompanying text (detailing identical language in Clayton Act and
RICO's civil enforcement provisions).
30 See Agency, infra note 146 (highlighting similarities between Clayton Act and RICO); see
also Holmes v. Sec. Inv'r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 267 (1992) ("We have repeatedly observed
that Congress modeled § 1964(c) on the civil-action provision of the federal antitrust laws, § 4 of
the Clayton Act ... ); Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 487 (1985) ("similar to the private
damage remedy found in the anti-trust laws. . .. [T]hose who have been wronged by organized crime
should at least be given access to a legal remedy.").
31 See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987)
(discussing remedies to violating designated statutes).
32 See id. at 150 (discussing RICO's civil enforcement provision).
33 Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 189 (1997).
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B. The Application ofRICO: From First Uses in Court Through Today
It took three years for the RICO Act to have its first reported judicial
opinion. 34 Because the RICO Act was such a novelty, prosecutors were
hesitant to push the statute's limitations to its full potential; at first, the cases
attacked the statute in broad terms rather than focusing on the interpretation
of its specific language.35 Early RICO cases involved classic racketeering
schemes directly involving legitimate economic activity or entering
legitimate business by criminal means.3 6 Prosecutors were now able to bring
cases they would not typically have jurisdiction over, and defendants, who
usually would have been tried separately, can now be tried together under
the same indictment.
The uses of RICO have greatly expanded from its singular intent to
take down the Italian Mafia and the mafia's infiltration of legitimate
businesses.38 Since RICO's existence, there have been 250 indictments
containing RICO counts, with a little more than one-third of them involving
Some of these indictments involve charges
criminal transactions.39

34 See Lynch, supra note 19, at 695 (discussing first RICO opinion). See also United States v.
Amato, 367 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (detailing first reported judicial encounter with RICO);
United States v. Cross, 474 F.2d 1045, 1046 (5th Cir. 1973) (describing first RICO indictment).
35 See Lynch, supra note 19, at 695 (analyzing how prosecutors originally handled RICO).
Many of the first RICO opinions were focused on the constitutionality of the Statute and attacked
it on a broad scale. Id. The reason why it focused on the constitutionality of the Statute was because
Congress did not define the required relationship needed between the racketeering activity and an
enterprise. Id. This was intentionally done by Congress because they wanted RICO to apply
whenever there was any relationship whatsoever between the racketeering and the operation of a
legitimate enterprise. Id.
36 See id. at 696 (considering early RICO cases); see, e.g., United States v. Campanale, 518
F.2d 352, 354 (9th Cir. 1975) (convicting local teamsters to force meat packers to use truck
companies through intimidation); United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 239 (2d Cir. 1975)
(charging officers of union accepting bribes to permit violations of collective bargaining
agreements); United States v. Green, 523 F.2d 229, 231-32 (2d Cir. 1975) (dismissing RICO counts
for large conspiracy among officers and truck company to steal seafood).
3 See Lynch, supra note 19, at 706 (highlighting unique effect of RICO's broad drafting).
Defendants with different types of involvements, big or small, can be tied into the same indictment.
Id.
3 See generally, id. at 723-34 (detailing how RICO is being used today compared to its
intended use); see also Daniel Hoppe, Racketeering After Morrison: ExtraterritorialApplication
ofCivil RICO, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1375, 1377 (2013) ("Over time, law enforcement agencies and
plaintiffs began using RICO to reach groups beyond the original aim of the statute, the American
Mafia. RICO is now used as a tool against legitimate enterprises, white-collar criminals, and
organizations with a social or political agenda, in addition to the American Mafia.").
39 See Lynch, supra note 19, at 724 (discussing indictments). The number of opinions
containing RICO claims is actually greater than 250 because they have appeared in the appellate
court system as well. See, e.g., United States v. Sutton, 700 F.2d 1078, 1079 (6th Cir. 1983) (ruling
on RICO claims brought against Carl Sutton); United States v. Elkins, 683 F.2d 143, 144 (6th Cir.
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regarding narcotics, prostitution, government corruption, contracts and
purchasing, and business crime.40 The RICO Act has moved far from where
it started, and the courts have hesitated to use its broad interpretation in order
to narrow its scope.4 1
II. PLAINTIFF'S STANDING PURSUANT TO RICO CLAIMS:
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL STANDING
INVOLVING RICO
To meet the standing requirements, the plaintiff generally must
prove they are entitled to bring a legal action against the defendant.4 2 When
dealing with foreign conduct in criminal RICO cases, prosecutors only have
to prove the defendant allegedly violated such provisions addressed in the
RICO Act.4 3 There is no need to prove anything further when dealing with
extraterritoriality; the court will find standing when the prosecution
sufficiently pleads the facts and shows the illegal activity affected foreign
commerce in some way."
The requirements necessary to plead a civil RICO case are more
complicated than the requirements for a criminal RICO case.4 5 The
Plaintiff's alleged injury must be caused by predicate acts that establish the
defendant's pattern of racketeering.46 A RICO plaintiff must also be the
intended target of the RICO scheme, meaning the defendant meant to
"attack" the plaintiffs business or property. 47 The Supreme Court recently
1982) (discussing RICO convictions); United States v. Hill, 646 F.2d 247, 248 (6th Cir. 1981)
(highlighting RICO cases that have reached federal appellate courts).
4 See Lynch, supra note 19, at 724 (listing case categories in which RICO claims were
brought).
41 See Racketeering-RICO In Need Of JRieform [sic], supra note 3 (highlighting Supreme
Court's narrowing interpretation of RICO); see also Scheidler v. Nat'lOrgan. for Women, 537 U.S.
393, 397 (2003) (holding RICO could not stop anti-abortion activists unless proof of underlying
crime). This case is only one example of the Supreme Court's effort to limit the plaintiffs use of
RICO. Id.
42 See Daniel J. Polatsek, PleadingStandingAnd Proximate Cause In Civil RICO Claims, NO.
1 PRAC. LITIGATOR, at 31 (Jan. 2006) (explaining definition of standing).
43 See STAFF OF ORGANIZED CRIME AND GANG SECTION U.S. DEP'T. OF JUST.,
CRIMINAL RICO: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS,
301-13 (May 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usam/file/870856/download (highlighting what
prosecutors must include in complaint to sufficiently plead RICO violation).
4 See id. at 307 (explaining nexus necessary for affecting foreign commerce).
45 See Polatsek, supra note 42, at 3-6 (expanding requirements of civil RICO standing).
46 See id. ("Simply put, if the injury does not arise out of one of the enunciated predicate acts
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 196 1(1), a RICO plaintiff is generally without standing.")
47 See id. (outlining requirements for plaintiffs). Being affected by the fraudulent scheme
perpetrated upon someone else will not give the plaintiff standing to bring a RICO claim. Id. If one
is an intended beneficiary of the fraudulent acts, one will also generally be without standing to
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made it even more difficult to plead a civil RICO case involving foreign
conduct.4 8 Now, if a private citizen wants to bring a case involving foreign
conduct or companies, he or she must prove a domestic injury occurred and
that such injury is the main conduct in the case.49
III. PRIOR DECISIONS INVOLVING RICO
Since RICO's existence, the Supreme Court has provided direction
on various issues involving its specific procedural rules.o This includes:
RICO's statute of limitations rule, RICO's accrual rule, and rules on
additional criminal conviction and racketeering activity requirements.'
Addressing these rules, the Supreme Court followed precedent involving §
4 of the Clayton Act.52
For instance, in Agency, Malley-Duff & Associates ("Malley") sued
Crown Life Insurance Company ("Crown Life"), a Canadian corporation,
alleging RICO violations under § 1985 and state civil conspiracy law.53 Due
allege a RICO claim. Id. If a RICO plaintiff is a direct business competitor of the defendant, one
may be able to establish standing if the predicate acts were directed at a third-party but were
intended to harm the competitor as a competitive injury. Id.
48 See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2211 (2016) ("Section
1964(c) requires a civil RICO plaintiff to allege and prove a domestic injury to business or property
and does not allow recovery for foreign injuries.").
49 See id. at 2106 (emphasis added) (explaining importance of domestic injury in plaintiff's
pleading).
50 See, e.g., Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 183-95 (1997) (looking at accrual rule
and statute of limitations for RICO); Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff& Associates, 483 U.S.
143, 156 (1987) (ruling on statute of limitations for RICO); Sedima v. Imrex Co. Inc., 473 U.S.
479, 490 (1985) (examining whether there were any additional criminal conviction and racketeering
activity requirements).
s' See, e.g., Klehr, 521 U.S. at 183-95 (observing accrual rule and statute of limitations for
RICO); Agency, 483 U.S. at 156 (establishing statute of limitations for RICO); Sedima, 473 U.S.
at 490 (determining additional criminal conviction and racketeering activity requirements).
52 See Klehr, 521 U.S. at 189 (ruling Congress consciously styled RICO Act after Clayton
Act); see also Agency, 483 U.S. at 156 ("[T]he Clayton Act clearly provides a far closer analogy
than any available state statute, and that the federal policies that lie behind RICO and the
practicalities of RICO litigation make the selection of the 4-year statute of limitations for Clayton
Act actions ....
the most appropriate limitations period for RICO actions."); see also Sedima, 473
U.S. at 489-90 (relying on congressional intent of Clayton Act when determining Congress's intent
for RICO).
53 See Agency, 483 U.S. at 145 (explaining parties in case). In April 1978, Malley first filed a
law suit against Crown Life alleging federal antitrust law violations and a claim for tortious
interference with a contract. Id. Before that lawsuit went to trial, Malley brought a subsequent
action in the same court alleging RICO claims and state civil conspiracy claims. Id. The two cases
were consolidated, but when the first case went to trial, the court severed the actions. Id. At issue
in Agency are the RICO claims. Id. The RICO claims stated that Crown Life and Agency Holding
"formed an enterprise whose purpose was to acquire by false and fraudulent means and pretenses
various Crown Life agencies that had lucrative territories." Id. This enterprise took over Malley,

316

JOURNAL OF TRIAL &APPELLATE ADVOCACY [Vol. XXIII

to a two-year statute of limitation, the district court granted Crown Life's
motion for summary judgment.54 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the District Court's opinion, stating the applicable statute of
limitations was the catch all "six-year limitation set up in Pennsylvania.""
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide upon the "appropriate statute
of limitation for civil enforcement actions brought under RICO."56
The Court started its analysis by determining whether there should
be one federal statute of limitations or if it should vary by state.5 7 The Court
settled on a uniform statute of limitations for civil RICO cases." The
Supreme Court then had to decide what the uniform statute of limitations
was going to be, so the Court looked to similar statutes for guidance.59 It
examined the similarities between civil RICO requirements and § 4 of the
Clayton Act, and determined § 4 offers the closest analogy. 60 Because of the

imposed an "impossibly high annual production quota," and then terminated the company when it
failed to meet said quota. Id. Malley also alleges that Crown Life and Agency obstructed justice
during discovery of the first lawsuit. Id.
54 Id. at 146. The district court compared the RICO statute of limitations to the limitations for
fraud claims, reasoning it was the best analogy. Id.
s See id.
56 See id.
57 See id.
s8 See Agency, 483 U.S. at 146 citing Delcostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158-59 (1983)
("In such situations we do not ordinarily assume that Congress intended that there be no time limit
on actions at all; rather, our task is to 'borrow' the most suitable statute or other rule of timelines
from some other source. We have generally concluded that Congress intended that the courts apply
the most closely analogous statute of limitations under state law.") . While looking to state law for
the statute of limitations remains the "norm" for courts, "where federal law provides a closer
analogy than any available state law and when the federal policies are at stake, the court has not
hesitated to turn away from state law." Id. at 148. Because previous courts have not adopted a
consistent statute of limitations for RICO cases, the Court believes a uniform statute of limitations
should be selected. Id. at 148-49.
9 See id. at 150 (explaining next step in court's analysis).
6 See Agency, 483 U.S. at 150-53 (examining similarities between Clayton Act and RICO).
The court reasoned,
[b]oth RICO and the Clayton Act are designed to remedy economic injury by providing
for the recovery of treble damages, costs, and attorney's fees. Both statutes bring to bear
the pressure of "private attorneys general" on a serious national problem for which public
prosecutorial resources are deemed inadequate; the mechanism chosen to reach the
objective in both the Clayton Act and RICO is the carrot of treble damages. Moreover,
both statutes aim to compensate the same type of injury; each requires that a plaintiff
show injury "in his business or property by reason of" a violation.
Id. at 151. The Court also noted the legislative intent behind enacting RICO, which included
proposals for treble damages and a civil remedy for private damages suits based on § 4 of the
Clayton Act. Id. at 152.
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similarities, the court ruled civil RICO cases should have a four-year statute
of limitations.61
Correspondingly, in Klehr, Marvin and Mary Klehr filed a civil
RICO action against A.O. Smith Harvestore ("Harvestore"), alleging
Harvestore committed several acts of mail and wire fraud causing injury to
their business.62 Harvestore moved to dismiss the claim because it was filed
almost twenty years after the acts were committed, which the district court
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found the
lawsuit untimely because of the violation of the statute of limitations.63 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the civil RICO's accrual rule.I
The Court first examined the circuit court's "last predicate act" rule,
and held the rule was inconsistent with the ordinary Clayton Act rule
believing the analogy between the two acts was helpful. 65 The Court held
that even though the private civil RICO right of action was modeled after the
Clayton Act, it does not offer all the solutions when ruling on aspects of
RICO.6 6 Affirming the Circuit Court's decision, the court explained it had

61

See id. at 156 (concluding Clayton Act offered best "federal law analogy").
[T]he Clayton Act clearly provides a far closer analogy than any available state statute,
and.. .that the federal policies that lie behind RICO and the practicalities of RICO
litigation make the selection of the 4-year statute of limitations for Clayton Act actions,
[], the most appropriate limitations period for the RICO actions.

Id.
62 See Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 183 (1997) (explaining facts in case).
Harvestore sold the Klehrs a special Harvestore brand silo that was used for storing cattle feed,
which they bought in reliance on Harvetore's representations that it would keep oxygen out of the
feed. Id. at 183-84. The Klehr's alleged that the representations were false; the silo did not keep
the oxygen out of the feed and it became moldy and fermented and because the cows ate the feed
there was a decrease in the milk production and profits. Id. at 184.
63 See id. at 184 (highlighting District Court's decision). The Klehrs argued that the lawsuit
was timely because they did not discover the mold hanging in the silo until 1991 when they opened
the silo wall and chopped through the feed. Id. at 185. The Eighth Circuit received the evidence de
novo and held that the Klehrs suffered one single continuous injury and that they should have
discovered the source of the injury well before August of 1989. Id.
6 See id. at 185 (explaining why Supreme Court granted certiorari). A circuit spilt forced the
Supreme Court to consider RICO's accrual rule. Id. There are three Circuit Courts that used the
"injury and pattern discovery" RICO accrual rule, while other Circuits have applied an "injury
discovery" rule. Id. The Third Circuit has used the "last predicate" rule. Id.
6 See Klehr, 521 U.S. at 186-88 (examining last predicate rule as only one that could help
Klehrs). The last predicate act rule states the limitations period beginning to run when a plaintiff
knew, or should have known, a RICO claim existed. Id. at 186. The Court ruled that the last
predicate act rule was not proper in this case because it created a limitations period longer than
what Congress could have contemplated, and was inconsistent with the ordinary Clayton Act rule.
Id. at 186-88. The Court reasoned that the Clayton Act was helpful because "it makes clear
precisely where, and how, the Third Circuit's rule goes too far." Id. at 189.
6 See id. at 193 (acknowledging shortfalls of Clayton Act).
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no reason to believe the lower court made any obvious or exceptional
errors. 6 7
Lastly, in Sedima, a Belgian corporation filed an action against
Imrex Co., asserting RICO claims under § 1964(c), including mail and wire
fraud .68 The district court and the court of appeals found the complaint
failed for two reasons: (1) it did not allege an injury "by reason of a violation
of section 1962," and (2) it did not allege the defendants had already been
criminally convicted of the "predicate acts of mail and wire fraud or a RICO
violation."" The Supreme Court granted certiorari to clarify the various
approaches taken by district courts on this important issue.70
The Court started its analysis by briefly reviewing the legislative
history of the private treble damages action through House Judiciary
Committee hearings and determined the civil right of action was mirrored
after § 4 of the Clayton Act." The Court then looked to the language of the
statute, holding that there is no predicate act requirement or criminal

67 See id. (refusing to look at Eighth Circuit application of its rule). The Court refused to
consider the Eighth Circuit's application of the rule because it would be highly fact based and the
writ of certiorari only permits it to decide the purely legal question of whether a claim accrues
where the respondent continued to commit the act during the four-year period immediately
preceding suit. Id.
68 See Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 484 (1985) (explaining RICO claim). Sedima
entered into a joint venture with Imrex to provide electronic components to a different firm where
the buyer would order parts through Sedima and Imrex would obtain the parts in the U.S. and send
them to Europe. Id. at 483-84. After the orders were complete, the two companies would spilt the
net proceeds. Id. at 484. Imrex filled around eight million dollars in orders through Sedima, thus
Sedima was convinced that Imrex was presenting inflated bills and cheating Sedima out of some
of the proceeds. Id. The complaint also alleged common law claims of unjust enrichment,
conversion, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and constructive trust. Id.
69 Id. at 484-86. The Court of Appeals reasoned:

[a]nalogizing to the Clayton Act, which has been the model for § 1964(c), the court
concluded that just as an antitrust plaintiff must allege an "antitrust injury," so a RICO
plaintiff must allege an "racketeering injury"- an injury "different in kind from that
occurring as a result of the predicate acts themselves, or not simply caused by the
predicate acts, but also caused by an activity which RICO was designed to deter."
Id. at 485. The court of appeals found the complaint did not allege the defendants had already been
criminally convicted of the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud, or of a RICO violation, which is
required in a RICO violation complaint. Id.
70 See id. at 486 (analyzing purpose for certiorari).
71 See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 486-97 (reviewing RICO's legislative history to rule on issues).
During the House Judiciary Committee, Senator Steiger suggested adding a private treble-damages
action similar ro that which is found in the anti-trust laws, reasoning it would enhance the
effectiveness of title IX's prohibitions. Id. at 487. At that time, the American Bar Association also
proposed an amendment based on § 4 of the Clayton Act, which was approved and described as
"another example of the antitrust remedy being adapted for use against organized criminality." Id.
(quoting 116 CONG. REC. 35295 (1970)).
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conviction requirement.7 2 Relying on legislative intent, history, and § 4 of
the Clayton Act, the Court reasoned there was no indication of any intent to
add the above mentioned requirements to the private RICO action for treble
damages and attorney fees.7 3
VI. EXTRATERRITORIAL USE AND APPLICATION
Throughout the Supreme Court's history of dealing with a statute's
extraterritoriality and whether a U.S. federal law can govern foreign injuries,
there have been three seminal cases where the Court laid out a foundation
for their decision in RJR Nabisco.7 4 Morrison, Kiobel, and Pfizer all dealt
with statutes in which the court vigorously examined and determined each
statute's application extraterritorially." Even though these cases do not
include the RICO Act, the Supreme Court and lower courts have used each
one to examine and compare their analysis when ruling on the civil
application of RICO."

72 See id. at 488-99 (highlighting reasons Court ruled there is no predicate act requirement).
The Court first found there is nothing in the language of the statute that indicated that there was a
prior conviction requirement. Id. The Court denied the court of appeals ruling that the prior
conviction requirement came from the term "violation," which this Court determined only refers to
a failure to adhere to legal requirements. Id. The Court then looked to the legislative history, where
it found that when relying on the Clayton Act model, private and governmental actions are entirely
separate and that if Congress had intended to impose this type of requirement, they would have at
least mentioned it at some point in the history. Id. at 489-90. The Court also rejected the court of
appeals' reasoning that, "[i]nstead of being used against mobsters and organized criminals, it has
become a tool for everyday fraud cases brought against 'respected and legitimate 'enterprises.""
Id. at 499. The Court then explained that Congress wanted to reach both legitimate and illegitimate
enterprises and "[i]t is not for the judiciary to eliminate the private action in situations where
Congress has provided it simply because plaintiffs are not taking advantage of it in its more difficult
applications." Id. at 499-500.
73 See id. at 499-500 (concluding no legislative intent to add requirements to RICO actions).
74 See generally Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 111-13 (2013) (asking
whether and when will Alien Tort Statute provide cause of action for foreign violations); Morrison
v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 250-51 (2010) (deciding whether Securities Exchange Act
provides cause of action to foreign plaintiffs); Pfizer v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308, 309 (1978)
(determining whether foreign nation can sue in U.S. courts for treble damages under anti-trust
laws).
7 See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 252-53 (determining whether §§ 10(b) and 20(a) of Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934 applied extraterritorially); see also Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662 (exploring
whether court recognizes Alien Tort Act Statute applies to conduct abroad); Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 311
(determining whether § 4 of Clayton Act applied extraterritorially).
76 See, e.g., RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100-02 (using Morrison and Kiobel as guidance
in analysis of RICO Act); United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 811 (11th Cir. 2010) (highlighting
circuit court who used Morrison in analyzing Torture Act); Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus.,
Inc., 631 F.3d 29, 32-33 (2d Cir. 2010) (using Morrison to analyze RICO relating to Russian oil
company).
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A. Morrison v. NationalAustralia Bank, Ltd.
Morrisoninvolved violations of § 10(b) and § 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.77 The complaint alleged that the defendant
manipulated financial models to make rates of early repayment
unrealistically low in order for their mortgage-servicing rights to appear
more valuable than they actually were." The plaintiffs were all Australians
who purchased stock in National's Ordinary Shares and sued in the United
9
States District Court for the Southern District of New York.7 The court was
tasked with determining whether the Securities Exchange Act provides a
cause of action to foreign plaintiffs suing American and foreign defendants
in connection with securities traded on foreign exchanges.so
The court began their analysis by looking at whether Congress
intended the statute to apply extraterritorially. 1 The court found no clear or
affirmative intent by Congress for this statute to apply extraterritorially. 82
The court then turned to the focus of the Securities Act and compared it to
the circumstances of the case.8 3 The court held the plaintiff failed to state a
n See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 252 (providing what statutes court examined).
7 See id. In 1998, National Bank bought Homeside Lending, Inc., a mortgage servicing
company headquartered in Florida. Id. at 251. Homeside calculated the present value of its
mortgage-servicing rights by using valuation models designed to take this likelihood into account.
Id. Their annual reports touted the success of the business. Id. The complaint also alleges
Homeside was aware of the deception and did nothing. Id.
' See id. (describing purpose of suit). National Australia Bank Limited was a large bank in
Australia that traded on the Australian Stock Exchange and other foreign securities exchanges, but
never in the United States. Id. at 251. Homeside Lending, Inc. is headquartered in Florida and its
executive officers are all in the United States. Id.
80 See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 250 (highlighting issue of case). There is a question of foreign
application in this case because the sales and exchanges happened outside the United States, even
though one of the defendants is domiciled in Florida. Id. at 252.
8 See id. at 255 (discussing court's analysis). The Court found there is a "longstanding
principle of American law 'that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant
to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."' Id. This establishes a
presumption about the statute's meaning, rather than limiting Congress's power to legislate. Id.
"Thus, 'unless there is the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed' to give a statute
extraterritorial effect, 'we must presume it is primarily concerned with domestic conditions."' Id.
82 See id. at 261-64 (discussing Congress' intent). The court focuses on the language of the
statute by first pointing out how it mentions interstate commerce which includes trade, commerce,
and transportation between any foreign country and any state. Id. at 262-63. The court immediately
contended that even though a statute states "broad language in their definitions of 'commerce' that
expressly refer to 'foreign commerce,' they still do not apply abroad." Id. at 263. The court then
looked to the public interest of the statute, which they concluded that nothing in the statute suggests
that the national public interest pertains to foreign exchanges and markets. Id. Lastly, the court
finds the statute does not apply aboard because the provision within the Securities Exchange Act
pertaining to extraterritorial use does not explicitly state "this law applies abroad." Id. at 265.
83 See id. at 266 (describing court's analysis). The court expressed their opinion of the
Securities Exchange Act's focus, which they concluded was the purchases and sales of securities
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claim, and the court did not have the jurisdiction to hear the case because
most of the conduct allegedly happened outside the United States and, as
previously determined, the Securities Exchange Act did not apply
extraterritorially.84
B. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., et al.
Similarly, in Kiobel, the court looked to whether they recognized a
claim for violations of the Alien Tort Statute that occurred outside the United
States." The complaint alleged that after the plaintiffs protested the
environmental effects of Petroleum, the defendants enlisted the Nigerian
government in efforts to violently stop the protests. 86 The plaintiffs escaped
the violence and fled to the United States for asylum, and after arriving,
decided to sue the Royal Dutch Petroleum for the conduct that happened in
Nigeria. 7 The court needed to decide if they had jurisdiction over this claim
and whether it gave rise to violations of the law of nations."

in the United States, rather than the place where the deception originated. Id. "It is the transactions
that the statute seeks to regulate" and protect the parties to the transaction. Id. at 267.
m See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 273 (stating holding of Morrison). The court adopts the
transactional test, which looks to whether the purchase or sale is made in the United States or the
security is listed on a domestic exchange. Id. at 275. Under this test, the transactions alleged in
Morrison all occurred in foreign locations, establishing the Acts inapplicability. Id. at 268.
8
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662 (2013) (highlighting issue of
case); see also Temchenko, supra note 13 and accompanying text (stating language of Alien Tort
Act).
8 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662 (discussing allegations alleged in complaint). The plaintiffs
were residents of Ogoniland (located in the Niger delta of Nigeria), where the defendants owned a
company that was "engaged in oil exploration and production in Ogoniland." Id. After they
protested the oil company's practices, the defendants hired the Nigerian government to stop the
protests. Id. The "Nigerian military and police forces attacked the Ogoni villages, beating, raping,
killing, and arresting residents and destroying their property." Id. The plaintiffs allege the
defendants helped the Nigerians do this by providing them "with food, transportation, and
compensation" for their actions. Id. at 1662-63.
8

See id. at 1663.

8 See id. (stating court's holding). The Alien Tort Statute provides "[t]he district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
1350). The petitioners alleged the respondents "violated the law of nations by aiding and abetting
the Nigerian Government in committing (1) extrajudicial killings; (2) crimes against humanity; (3)
torture and cruel treatment; (4) arbitrary arrest and detention; (5) violations of the rights to life,
liberty, security, and association; (6) forced exile; and (7) property destruction." Id. The United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed four out of the seven claims
but "[t]he Second Circuit court dismissed the entire complaint, reasoning that the law of nations
does not recognize corporate liability." Id. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to consider
the corporate liability and then, after oral arguments the supplemental briefs addressed the question
of extraterritoriality. Id.
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Again, the court began with an analysis of whether there had been
89
legislative intent to make this statute apply extraterritorially. In this case,
the Supreme Court found that no such intent existed from the textual words
of the statute and the history of its use had never applied the statute
extraterritorially.9 0 Next, the Court looked to the conduct of the case and
how the focus of the statute compared to the main conduct the complaint
alleged.9 1 All the conduct in this case occurred outside of the United States,
resulting in the plaintiffs' inability to sue a United States entity for conduct
92
that occurred abroad, forcing the court to dismiss the case.
C. Pfizer, Inc., et al. v. Government ofIndia et al.
Lastly, in Pfizer, the United States Supreme Court was faced with
determining whether § 4 of the Clayton Act allows foreign plaintiffs that
93
The
were injured abroad to bring an action within the United States.
plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the defendants "conspired to restrain
and monopolize interstate and foreign trade in the manufacturing,
94
distribution, and sale of broad spectrum antibiotics."

"Each [plaintiffl

claimed that as a purchaser of said antibiotics," they incurred injuries to their

89 See id. (noting court's first analysis).
The court justified the presumption against
extraterritorial application by stating, "the presumption against extraterritorial application helps
ensure that the Judiciary does not erroneously adopt an interpretation of U.S. law that carries
foreign policy consequences not clearly intended by the political branches" and "this presumption
'serves to protect against unintended clashes between our law and those of other nations which
could result in international discord."' Id. (citing EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S.
244, 248 (1991)).
90 See id. at 1665-69 (analyzing extraterritorially of Alien Tort Act). The court recognized that
"any civil action" does not "suggest [the] application to torts committed aboard;" and that "it is
well established that the word 'any' or 'every"' does not overcome "the presumption against
extraterritoriality." Id. at 1665. The Act's historical background only applied to cases which
involved "violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy" none
of which provide any intent of extraterritorial application or intent. Id. at 1666-69.
91 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (comparing statute and complaint).
92 See id. (stating purpose of Kiobel case). "[E]ven where the claims touch and concern the
territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption
against extraterritorial application." Id.
93 See Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 309 (1979) (describing issue of case).
Specifically, the Court was asked to determine whether a foreign nation is entitled to sue in the
United States' courts for treble damages under the antitrust laws. Id.
94 Id. at 310. The plaintiffs were "the Government of India, the Imperial Government of Iran,
and the Republic of the Philippines" and the defendants were "six pharmaceutical manufacturing
companies." Id. The defendants allegedly violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. Among
these violations, the plaintiffs alleged the defendants engaged in "price fixing, market division,

and fraud." Id.
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"business or property by the alleged antitrust violations and sought treble
damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act."9 5
The Court began by looking at Congress's intent to whom they
considered was a "person" under § 4 of the Clayton Act.96 When examining
legislative history, Congress intended "person" to be naturally broad and
inclusive, meaning that it established "the right of anybody to sue who
chooses to sue." 97 The Court held both the Sherman and Clayton Acts
explicitly include the words "corporations and associations existing under or
authorized by.. .the laws of any foreign country."" Therefore, Congress did
not intend for the treble-damages remedy to be available to plaintiffs only in
our country.99 The Court reasoned that if § 4 of the Clayton Act serves to
deny a foreign plaintiff who has been injured by an antitrust violation, the
right to sue, it would defeat the Act's purpose.' 0 0 The Court concluded that
a foreign nation "may sue for treble damages under the antitrust laws to the
same extent as any other plaintiff."'o'
V. RJR NABISCO, INC., ET AL. V. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, ET
AL.
RJR Nabisco is the latest case the Supreme Court has ruled upon
dealing with the extraterritorially application of RICO. 10 2 In RJR Nabisco,
the complaint alleged an organization which included Colombian and
Russian drug traffickers smuggling narcotics into Europe.0 I The complaint
95 Id.
96 See id. at 312 (looking at where court began their analysis).
9 See id. at 312-13. During the floor debates for this statute, the word "person" was being
used interchangeably with other terms with an even broader connotation than was being given to
"any party." Id.
98 See id. at 313.
9 See Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 314 (arguing Congress' intent).
1 See id. at 314-15 (explaining Court's reasoning). § 4 of the Clayton Act has two purposes,
one is "to deter violators and deprive them of 'fruits of their illegality,' and the other is 'to
compensate victims of antitrust violations for their injuries. "' Id. at 314. The Court also mentioned
that "an exclusion of all foreign plaintiffs would lessen the deterrent effect of treble damages." Id.
at 315.
101 See id. at 319-20 (stating Court's conclusion). The Court also mentioned their conclusion
does not interfere with any matter of foreign policy because it is already established that
governments who are recognized by the United States and who are at peace with the United States
can use their court system. Id.
102 See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2090 (2016) (noting additional
Supreme Court cases brought on this topic).
103 See id. at 2098 (stating complaint's allegations). The complaint alleges a scheme using a
series of transactions involving black-market money brokers, cigarette importers, and wholesalers
to pay for large shipments of cigarettes into Europe. Id. It is also alleged that RJR Nabisco dealt
directly with drug traffickers and money launderers in South America and sold cigarettes to Iraq in
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further alleges that RJR Nabisco engaged in a pattern of racketeering
activity, including money laundering, material support to foreign terrorist
04
organizations, mail fraud, wire fraud, and violations of the Travel Act.1
RJR Nabisco allegedly formed an association that engaged in interstate and
foreign commerce, constituting as a RICO enterprise.'0 o The Court held
there is a two-step analysis when determining RICO's extraterritorial
application; the first step being: "do RICO's substantive prohibitions,
contained in § 1962, apply to conduct that occurs in foreign countries?" and
the second: "does RICO's private right of action, contained in § 1964(c),
6
apply to injuries that are suffered in foreign countries?"o
In order to determine whether RICO's substantive prohibitions
apply to conduct that occurs in foreign countries, the Court again looked to
the Congressional intent behind creating the law.107 The Court found
"[a]bsent clearly expressed congressional intent to the contrary, federal laws
will be construed to have only domestic application." 0 The Supreme Court
further emphasizes that Congressional intent is not whether "Congress would
have wanted" a statute to apply to foreign conduct, but rather, whether
Congress had "affirmatively and unmistakably instructed that the statute
[would] do so." 0 9 This created a presumption that statutes do not apply
extraterritorially. 110
If the statute is not extraterritorial, the second step the court must
take is to look at the statute's focus to determine whether it involves a

violation of international sanctions and infiltrated Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation to
expand those illegal activities. Id.
104 See id. (explaining what RJR Nabisco complaint alleges).
'os See id at 2098 (highlighting allegations plead by European Community). When putting all
the allegations together, the complaint alleges that RJR Nabisco violated all of RICO's prohibitions.
Id. The European Community alleges they were damaged in various ways, including competitive
harm to their cigarette business, lost tax revenue from black-market sales, harm to European
financial institutions, currency instability, and increased costs to law enforcement. Id.
The Court started its inquiry by considering each of these questions
106 Id. at 2099.
individually beginning by looking to the law of extraterritoriality to guide them. Id.
107 See id. at 2100 (explaining how court should start analysis of extraterritoriality).
108 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2100; see also Morrison v. National Austria Bank Ltd., 561
U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (explaining presumption against extraterritorially).
109 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2100. The Court emphasizes the importance of finding clear
and unequivocal congressional intent in order for them to conclude that the statute reaches activities
abroad. Id.
110 See id. at 2100-101 (highlighting why courts have presumption). The court gave several
reasons why the Supreme Court has set up such a presumption. Id. First, it serves to avoid
international discord that can result from United States law applying to conduct in foreign countries.
Id. Secondly, it reflects the commonsense notion that Congress legislates with a domestic concern
in mind. Id. Two examples of when the court applies this presumption can be seen in Morrison
and Kiobel. Id.; Morrison, 561 U.S. at 262-65; Kiobel, 133 S. Ct at 1665-69.
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domestic application of the case."' If the facts of the case that are relevant
to the statute's focus occurred in the United States, then the case has
permissible domestic application, even if other events occurred abroad.1 12 If
the conduct relevant to the statute's focus occurred abroad, then the case
involves impermissible extraterritorial application regardless of the other
alleged conduct that may have happened in the United States.' 13 If during
step one, the court finds the statute has extraterritorial effect, the focus of the
statute does not need to be broken down because the conduct would then
apply to the statute as a whole." 4 The scope of the statute then turns on the
limits Congress has or has not imposed on its foreign application."'
In the majority's opinion, the Court looked at the RICO act from two
different viewpoints, the statute as a whole and the private right of action
under the statute or connected with the statute. 116 As a whole, the Court held
Congress had the intention to incorporate extraterritorial predicates into
RICO, that gives a clear and affirmative indication that RICO applies
extraterritorially."' RICO has a unique and rare structure that clearly
evidences an extraterritorial effect although it is not expressly stated." The
court then broke down each subsection and ruled § 1962 (a) only applies to
domestic uses of the income, § 1962 (b) and (c) apply extraterritorially, and
did not conclude on the issue of whether § 1962 (d) applied
"' See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101 (looking at statute's focus comparing it to main

conduct of case).
112 See id. (discussing application in United States).
113 See id. (stating process if conduct took place abroad).
114 See id. (usingMorrison to see where court looks after they found Congress did have intent).
"[I]t was necessary to consider § 10(b)'s 'focus' only because we found that the statute does not
apply extraterritorially: If § 10(b) did apply abroad, we would not need to determine which
transnational frauds it applied to; it would apply to all of them (barring some other limitation)."
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267.
11
See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101 (stating Congress' ability to narrow statute).
16 See generally RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101-111(highlighting how court broke down
analysis portion of this case).
117 See id. at 2102 (expressing Court's holding). The most obvious textual clue the Court
found to support their finding is that RICO defines racketeering activity to include some predicates
that clearly apply to some foreign conduct. Id. The predicates include "the prohibition against
engaging in monetary transactions in criminally derived property, which expressly applies when
'the defendant is a United States person,' to offenses that 'take place outside the United States."'
Id. at 2101. Other examples include prohibitions against assassinating government officials, taking
hostages, and killing a national of the United States while the national is outside of the United
States. Id.
"1 See id. at 2102 (furthering why Congress intended RICO to apply extraterritorially).
"Congress has not expressly said that § 1962(c) applies to patterns of racketeering activity in
foreign countries, but it has defined 'racketeering activity'- and by extension a 'pattern of
racketeering activity'- to encompass violations of predicate structures that do expressly apply
extraterritorially." Id. The court further noted it would be hard to imagine how Congress could
have more clearly indicated that it intended RICO to apply extraterritorially. Id. at 2103.
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extraterritorially."' 9 The second standard which must be met requires a
RICO enterprise to engage in, or affect in some significant way, commerce
directly involving the United States and foreign commerce.1 20 As a result of
this analysis, the court held that European Community's allegations that RJR
Nabisco violated § § 1962 (b) and (c) does involve a permissible application
of RICO. 121
Lastly, the majority turned to the statute's application of a private
right of action.1 2 2 The private right of action, documented under § 1964(c),
created an avenue allowing any person who is injured in their business or
property in violation of RICO to sue for damages.1 23 The Court applied the
same two step analysis as in § 1962 to § 1964(c), reasoning a private action
raises issues beyond the mere consideration of whether Congress intended
the statute to apply extraterritorially.1 24 However, the Court determined
nothing in § 1964(c) provides a clear and affirmative indication that
Congress intended for private action suits to apply extraterritorially.1 25 The
Court further determined they would not read § 1964(c) as broadly as they
would other acts, such as the Clayton Act, and held private action plaintiffs
must allege and prove a domestic injury to business and property in order to
bring a RICO violation.1 2 6
Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion, in which she agreed
with the majority in all aspects except for the private right of action

1'9 See id. at 2103 (describing how court ruled on each subsection of § 1962). § 1962(a) deals
with certain uses of income derived from a pattern of racketeering and not the use of the pattern
itself, indicating that it should only be used on domestic uses of the income. Id. §§ 1962(b) and (c)
can be applied extraterritorially because of the predicates in its wording previously discussed. Id.;
see also RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2102 (describing predicate acts).
120 See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2105 ("Enterprises whose activities lack that anchor to
United States commerce cannot sustain a RICO violation.").
121 See id. at 2106 (stating court's ruling).
122 See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2106 (turning to private right of action portion of decision).
123 See id. (stating purpose of § 1964(c)).
124 See id. (expressing court's reasoning). One of the issues of providing a civil remedy for
foreign conduct is that it creates a potential for international friction beyond that presented by
merely applying U.S. law to foreign conduct. Id. An example of this was given involving antitrust
laws and anticompetitive conduct taking place abroad and it has generated controversy in other
nations. Id. "[T]o apply [U.S.] remedies would unjustifiably permit their citizens to bypass their
own less generous remedial schemes, thereby upsetting a balance of competing considerations that
their own domestic antitrust laws embody." Id. at 2106-07.
125 See id. at 2108 (stating Congress' intent not to apply RICO extraterritorially). The Court
reasoned the words "any", "business or property" were insufficient to displace the presumption
against extraterritoriality. Id. Adding those limitations, excluding personal injury, signals that
Congress intended civil remedies to not be coextensive with § 1962. Id.
126 See id. at 2109 ("Although [Court has] often looked to the Clayton Act for guidance in
construing § 1964 (c), [they] have not treated the two statutes as interchangeable.").
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decision. 12 7 This dissent argued that there is no need to distinguish civil and
criminal cases when dealing with extraterritorially because § 1964(c) is
triggered by a violation of § 1962 and all § 1964(c) does is give an additional
avenue for one to use RICO. 128 Justice Ginsburg used the Clayton Act, with
its similar language, to argue that the Court should interpret § 1964(c)
similarly and allow for private citizens to apply RICO extraterritorially.1 2 9
Lastly, the dissent noted that despite the majority's expressed concern
regarding creating a double standard within foreign policy, this decision did
just that. 130
VI. IGNORING CONGRESSIONAL INTENT, DOUBLE STANDARD
OR PROTECTING INTERNATIONAL TENSION?
The Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act has been
used in such broad ways that its practices have surpassed Congress'
originally anticipated use."' The legislature intentionally constructed RICO
so it would reach both illegitimate and legitimate businesses for any
racketeering activities. 132 Since the statute is being used to attack legitimate
businesses, the courts are now trying to narrow its scope to limit the available
civil remedies.' 33 The biggest issue with this narrowing is that it is not for

127 See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2112 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining dissent's
position).
128 See id. at 2113 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explain RICO position). "How can § 1964(c)
exclude them when, by its express terms, § 1964(c) is triggered by 'a violation of section 1962?"'

Id.
129 See id. at 2114 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (comparing § 1964(c) and Clayton Act). § 4 of
the Clayton Act, which is often used as guidance for § 1964(c), has held a remedy for injuries both
foreign and domestic. Id.
130 See id. at 2115-116 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing civil remedies should be viewed in
same capacity as criminal cases). "U.S. defendant commercially engaged here and abroad would
be answerable civilly to U.S. victims of their criminal activities, but foreign parties similarly injured
would have no RICO remedy." Id.
131 See Racketeering- Rico In Need of [R]eform [sic] (last visited October 13, 2016),
http://law.jrank.org/pages/9629/Racketeering-RICO-IN-NEED-FEFORM.html (explaining RICO
used in civil law when it was not originally intended to be). When critics called for congressional
reform, the U.S. Supreme Court made it clear that, unless amended by Congress, RICO must be

interpreted broadly. Id.
132 See Lynch, supra note 19, at 671-83 (explaining why and how Congress drafted RICO
broadly); see also United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975) (detailing different
ways RICO has been used since its creation).
133 See Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (highlighting Court of Appeals' attempt
to narrow scope of RICO). The Appeals Court's main objection was that "[i]nstead of being used
against mobsters and organized criminals, it has become a tool for everyday fraud cases brought
against 'respected and legitimate 'enterprises."' Id.

328

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY [Vol. XXIII

the judiciary to limit or change the broad nature of RICO; it should be left to
the legislature to change the limits, if necessary. 13 4
A. IgnoringLegislative Intent
The Court typically looks to the legislative intent when dealing with
extraterritorial applications and if there was an affirmative intent
demonstrated by Congress as to whether the law should be applied beyond
the borders of the United States, yet in this case, the Supreme Court ignored
that intent when imposing a domestic injury requirement onto the private
plaintiff.13 5 When Congress was creating RICO, they intentionally kept the
statute broad and made the scope of § 1962, the predicate acts portion, reach
foreign injuries.13 6 Congress then added § 1964(c) to give private suitors a
civil remedy for violations of § 1962 to their business or property.' 37 When
incorporating one statute into another, Congress has long understood to
encompass into the statute "all that is fairly covered by the reference," and
in this case, it includes foreign injuries. 1 8
In the present case at hand, the Court had no trouble finding that §
1962 extends extraterritorially, even though there was no express language
in the statute that indicated as such. 3 9 The Court reasoned that the express
statement of extraterritoriality is not essential to overcoming the presumption
against extraterritoriality, contradicting the Court's reasoning in not one, but
two previous cases.1 40 The Court further stated, "this unique structure makes
134 See id. at 499-500 ("Yet this defect-if defect it is-is inherent in the statute as written,

and its correction must lie with Congress. It is not for the judiciary to eliminate the private action
in situations where Congress has provided it simply because plaintiffs are not taking advantage of
it in its more difficult applications."); see also RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2112 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (stating Court had no authority to amend RICO when replacing Congress's intent with
domestic-injury requirement).
135 See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2112 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Unsupported by RICO's
text, inconsistent with its purposes, and unnecessary to protect the comity interests the Court
emphasizes, the domestic-injury requirement for private suits replaces Congress' prescription with
one of the Court's own invention.").
136 See supra Section I Part A (detailing Congress' intent in creating RICO); see also RJR
Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2103 (emphasizing Congress' clear intentions for RICO to have
extraterritorially applied).
1 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (highlighting actual text of statute).
1 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2113 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting statutory interpretation).
RICO's private right of action simply incorporates § 1962, which the Court incorrectly determined
did not reach extraterritorially. Id.
"' See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2102-103 ("Short of an explicit declaration, it is hard to
imagine how Congress could have more clearly indicated that it intended RICO to have (some)
extraterritorial effect.").
140 Compare id. at 2102 ("The presumption against extraterritoriality does not require us to
adopt such a constructed interpretation. While the presumption can be overcome only by a clear
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RICO the rare statute that clearly evidences extraterritorial effect despite
lacking express statement of extraterritoriality." 14 1
How can the Court be so bold as to state that RICO reaching foreign
injuries is one of those rare statutes but § 1964(c), the section that simply
adds an additional avenue for private suitors to remedy their injuries, does
not reach extraterritoriality?l 4 2 The fact that RICO is being used against
respected businesses that allegedly engaged in a pattern under the statute is
not a reason to assume the statute is being misconstrued.143 Adding the
domestic injury rule clearly undermines Congress' intent for the statute to be
applied to both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises extraterritorially. 1 4
B. Similarity to § 4 of the Clayton Act
The Supreme Court also ignored Congress' clear intention to model
the private suitor portion of RICO after § 4 of the Clayton Act. 145 During
the Committee meetings, Senators and the American Bar Association clearly
referenced the Clayton Act when suggesting the addition of § 1964(c) and
meant for the two statutes to work in the similar ways. 1 The two statutes
are nearly identical, which is an obvious indication that Congress intended
indication of extraterritoriality is not essential . . Congress has not expressly said that § 1962(c)
applies to patterns of racketeering activity in foreign countries, but it has defined 'racketeering
activity'- and by extension a 'pattern of racketeering activity'-to encompass violation of predicate
statutes that do expressly apply extraterritorially."), with Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd.,
561 U.S. 247, 247-62 (2010) (declining to find express language in statute enough to overcome
presumption against extraterritorial application), and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.
Ct. 1659, 1664-69 (2013) (refusing to rebut presumption against extraterritorially for Alien Tort
Statute when historical context was present).
141 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2103.
142 See id. at 2113 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The sole additional condition § 1964(c) imposes
on access to relief is an injury to one's 'business or property.' Nothing in that condition should
change the extraterritoriality assessment. . .'[i]f an injury abroad was proximately caused by the
violation of a statute which congress intended should apply to injurious conduct performed abroad,
[there is] no reason to import a domestic injury requirement simply because the victim sought
redress through the RICO statute.").
143 See Sedima v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (highlighting RICO's uses). "[The]
fact that RICO has been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not
demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth." Id. (quoting Hareco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 747 F.2d. 384, 398 (1983)).
144 See id. (discussing breadth of RICO in comparison to its ambiguity).
145 See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 150-52
(1987) (applying statute of limitation already established in Clayton Act to RICO); Klehr v. A.O.
Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 189-91 (1997) (determining Clayton Act's accrual rule is most
appropriate for RICO); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 489-90 (1985) (refusing to give RICO predicate act
requirement based on Congress' history in creating RICO).
146 See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 486 (highlighting Judiciary Committee and American Bar
Association's comments on creating RICO based on Clayton Act).
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the two to encompass the same abilities.147 Since the Supreme Court has had
no trouble finding that other aspects of RICO should be modeled after the
Clayton Act, there is no reason for the Court not to do the same with its
application to reach extraterritorially.14 8 The Court has gone so far as taking
the statute of limitations from the Clayton Act and deeming it the universal
RICO statute of limitations. 149 There is no reason they should not do the
same now with the statute's extraterritorial application.'s
The Court was reluctant to read § 1964(c) as broadly as they have
read the Clayton Act because RICO lacks the language that Pfizer found
integral to its decision."' What the Court overlooked was that they expressly
did not want to rely on Pfizer because years later, in Morrison,the Court held
that "even statutes . .. that expressly refer to 'foreign commerce' do not
apply abroad."l52 However, the Court contradicts itself from the ruling seven
147 See Agency, 483 U.S. at 150 (highlighting comparison between § 4 of Clayton Act and
RICO). Congress mirrored the Clayton Act by using similar language present in the two statutes.
Id. For example, the Clayton Act provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sure therefor in any district court of the United
States... and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)). RICO's civil enforcement provisions reads: "Any person injured
in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor
in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains
and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Id. at 150-51 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §
1964(c)).
'4 See, e.g., Agency, 483 U.S. at 156 (1987) (ruling on statute of limitations for RICO similarly
to Clayton Act); Ilehr, 521 U.S. at 183-95 (1997) (comparing Clayton Act's accrual rule and statute
of limitations with ones for RICO); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 490 (1985) (ruling on additional criminal
conviction and racketeering activity requirements for RICO equally to Clayton Act).
149 See Agency, 483 U.S. at 156 (holding four-year statute of limitations used in Clayton Act
as most appropriate for RICO).
Iso See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2090, 2114 (2016) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The similarity
of language in [the two statutes] is, of course, a strong indication that [they] should be interpreted
paripassu, and I see no contradictory indication here.") (quoting Northcross v. Board of Ed. of
Memphis City Schools, 412 U.S. 427,428 (1973)). The Court has similarly aligned RICO's private
right of action with the private right afforded by the Clayton Act when there were gaps in § 1964(c).
RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2114 (dissent, J. Ginsburg).
151 See id. at 2110 (explaining Court's reluctance to read RICO broadly).
"[T]he Pfizer Court expressed concern that it would 'defeat th[e] purposes' of the
antitrust laws if a defendant could 'escape full liability for his illegal actions'. . .[b]ut
this justification was merely an attempt to 'divin[e] what Congress would have wanted'
had it considered the question of extraterritoriality-an approach was eschewed in
Morrison."
Id.
152

Id.
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pages earlier that the "unique structure makes RICO the rare statute that
clearly evidences extraterritorial effect despite lacking an express statement
of extraterritoriality."1 3 The Court should have ruled that because of the
unique structure of RICO, and because § 1964(c) uses the exact language of
§ 4 of the Clayton Act, the private suitor provision of RICO also reaches
extraterritorial conduct. 15 4
C. Other Methods ofProtection
The Court's holding in RJR Nabisco went too far in its attempt to
prevent situations where the United States courts have jurisdiction over
solely foreign injuries.1 5 The Court failed to remember there are already
methods placed in the court system to handle situations such as these. 15 6 The
doctrines of forum non conveniens and due process help the court provide a
check against civil RICO litigation with little or even no connection to the
United States. 5 ' The Court's comity concerns that were not present in this
case can be solved with the controls of due process and forum non
conveniens, which makes that issue moot.'
D. IncreasingForeign Tension?
Another point the Supreme Court made in its decision was that
allowing a civil remedy for foreign conduct "creates a potential for
international friction beyond that presented by merely applying U.S.
substantive law to that foreign conduct.""' What the Court failed to realize

153 Id. at 2103.
154 See id. at 2113-14 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that statutes having similar

language is strong indication to interpret both similarly).
155 See id. (explaining why Court did not need to worry about comity concerns).
1s6 See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2115 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating due process and
forum non conveniens are avenues available to courts).
157 See id. (describing United States courts' ability to use forum non conveniens to refuse
jurisdiction). The doctrine of forum non conveniens enables the court to refuse jurisdiction when
there is an alternative, more appropriate forum available. Id. Due process acts as a constraint on a
court's personal jurisdiction over corporations unless the corporation has affiliations with the forum
in which the suit is brought to render that forum the corporations home essentially. Id.
158 See id. (explaining court's reasoning).
159 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2106. Even though international tension is not a prerequisite
for applying the presumption against extraterritoriality, the Court reasoned that when a risk is so
evident, "the need to enforce the presumption is at its apex." Id. at 2107. The Court then continued
by giving examples of international friction caused by applying U.S. law to foreign content. Id. One
example the court gave was in the area of antitrust law. Id. The Court has previously observed
that "'[t]he application ... of American private treble-damages remedies to anticompetitive
conduct taking place aboard has generated considerable controversy' in other nations, even when
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is that baring foreign plaintiffs from bringing a civil suit for injuries to their
business or property abroad is "hardly solicitous of international comity or
respectful of foreign interests."1 60 Typically, a foreign nation is "entitled to
prosecute any civil claim in the courts of the United States upon the same
basis as a domestic corporation or individual might do. To deny him this
privilege would manifest a want of comity and friendly feeling."' The
Court attempted to protect foreign nations by limiting this double standard
they were afraid of, but in reality, the Court created a double standard in
which U.S. defendants commercially engaged domestically and abroad
would now be answerable civilly to U.S. victims of their activities, but
foreign parties similarly injured would have no RICO remedy.162
E. What the Supreme CourtShould Have Done
The Supreme Court should have ruled that § 1964(c) overcomes the
presumption against extraterritoriality and foreign parties injured by such
activities should be given a private action remedy under RICO. 1 63 The Court

those nations agree with U.S. substantive law on such things as banning price fixing." Id. at 2106
(quoting F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 167 (2004)). Another
example the Court offered was in connection with Morrison, when France informed the Court that
"Imost foreign countries proscribe securities fraud' but 'have made very different choices with
respect to the best way to implement that proscription,' such as 'prefer[ring] 'state actions, not
private ones' for the enforcement of law."' Id. at 2107 (quoting Amicus Curiae, O.T. 2009, No. 081191). The Court furthered this example by stating, "[a]llowing foreign investors to pursue private
suits in the United States, we were told, 'would upset that delicate balance and offend the sovereign
interests of foreign nations."' Id.
160 Id. at 2115. Not allowing any private suit for injuries might spark international conflict
rather than calm it. Id.
161 See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2115 (noting right of foreign nation to prosecute civil claim).
Additionally, RICO's provisions already exclude activity that is conducted in its entirety in foreign
countries. Id. For example, there would never be a RICO case where the injuries are a part of
murders in Italy committed by Italian organized crime location in Italy. Id.
162 See id. at 2115-116 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (highlighting how Court actually created
double standard). Cf Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308, 319 (1978) (allowing foreign
nations to bring suit in U.S. for treble damages under antitrust laws). The Court in Pfizer addressed
the issue of international tension by stating, "[t]o exclude foreign nations from the protections of
our antitrust laws would, on the other hand, create a conspicuous exception to this rule, an exception
that could not be justified in the absence of clear legislative intent." Id.
163 See id. at 2113 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("I would hold, RICO reaches extraterritorial
injury when, pursuant to § 1964(c), the suitor is a private plaintiff."); see also Owen Pell et al.,
FurtherLimiting the ExtraterritorialReach of US Law, the US Supreme Court Limits the Use of
2016),
8,
(July
CASE
&
WHITE
Statute,
RICO
the
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/further-limiting-extraterritorial-reach-us-law-ussupreme-court-limits-use-rico ("[T]he RJR decision will significantly limit the ability of non-US
plaintiffs to use RICO to reach non-US claims, will further limit the reach of civil damage claims
arising under all other federal laws, and will likely influence how US states interpret the reach of
state statutes to non-US conduct.").
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should have recognized that § 1964(c) was placed into RICO to give victims
a civil remedy for the injuries they incurred to their business or property due
to violations of §§ 1962-1964, and found the sections to encompass the
benefits of extraterritoriality similar to its referenced sections. 1" It should
be left to Congress to add a domestic-injury requirement if it feels RICO's
private civil remedy needs it, not for the judiciary.165
VII. CONCLUSION
The Racketeering Influenced Corruption Organization Act allows
not only the government, but private citizens to be compensated for the
injuries they have incurred due to violations of racketeering activities.
Throughout its history, RICO has been interpreted in its broadest sense and
has applied with this open-viewed approach. The Court in RJR Nabisco took
it into their own hands to narrow the reach of RICO's private plaintiff
actions, which was not theirs to do. The domestic-injury requirement should
not have been created and may have further negative ramifications than the
Court anticipated.
Hannah Tavella

16 See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2115 (highlighting what Court should have ruled).
165

See Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499-500 (1985) (reasoning it is Congress' job to

change statutes as they see fit).

